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This paper uses a comprehensive firm level data set for the manufacturing sector in 
Italy to investigate the effect of government support on privately financed R&D 
expenditure. Estimates from a two-step equation model suggest that public 
assistance has a positive effect on private R&D investment. A non parametric 
matching procedure is also used to investigate the same effect. Here again the results 
suggest that the recipient firms achieve more private R&D than they would have 
without public support. The paper also examines whether public funding effects the 
financial sources available for R&D and finds that grants encourage credit financing 
for R&D. The effects on the use of internal sources are not conclusive. 
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Government financial support for R&D has become common in 
industrialized countries. It is hoped that public subsidies will result in 
additional private investment that would not have occurred without 
public support. Market failures in real and financial markets offer scope 
and justification for public support, as the return may be not sufficient to 
justify private investment. The broad consensus on the use of public 
support is based on the inefficiencies of the market. These create a gap 
between private and social return on R&D, and as a result less than 
optimal levels of research. Incomplete appropriability of research output 
and externalities deriving from the public good nature of R&D are at the 
base of this (Nelson, 1959; Arrow, 1962). There is also asymmetric 
information about the expected outcome of R&D investments and sunk 
costs in R&D investment. Moreover investment in R&D is riskier than 
investment in physical assets, and as a result there are likely to be more 
financial constrained (Hyytinen and Tovainen, 2005; Czarnitzki, 2006).  
Public investment is designed to encourage firms to carry out 
R&D by lowering marginal costs and decreasing the uncertainties that 
are typically connected to this activity. In addition to these direct effects 
at the firm level, positive indirect impacts are also expected to spill over 
to other firms in the system. There may also be an effect on the financial 
resources available to the firms. If these increase, the incentive has a 
positive effect on investment, but if they decrease subsidies turn into 
simple substitution of financing, with little effect on investment. The 
latter implies that the subsidized firms would have invested in research 
even if there had been no public support. R&D spending is only 
enhanced if the grants stimulate firms to undertake R&D projects that 
would be unprofitable in the absence of public support (Jaffe, 2002; 
Wallsten, 2000; Klette et al, 2000). Seen from this perspective, it 
becomes necessary to demonstrate that the programmes are effective in 
increasing R&D.  
One of the problems in assessing the effectiveness of most public 
R&D financial programs is determining whether they might crowd out 
private financing of R&D. Since government grants are likely to be 
cheaper than funds from the capital markets, firms are encouraged to 
apply for public support for R&D even when private funds are available 
(Jaffe, 2002; Blanes and Busom, 2004). In such cases public subsidies are 
simply a substitute for private capital. This is particularly true when 
policy-makers support the potentially most profitable R&D projects in 
order to avoid wasting public funds. Nevertheless, there are also 
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counteracting effects. Even though it is possible that such substitution 
occurs at firm level, at aggregate level the fact that certain firms obtains 
subsidies implies that others did not, and this makes it rather difficult to 
determine the net final effect (Hujer and Radic, 2005).  
Considerable effort has been devoted to evaluating the efficiency 
of public support for R&D. Despite the quantity of literature on 
evaluation of public R&D policies, there is no consensus and the results 
are rather controversial (David & Hall, 2000; David et al.; 2000; Klette et 
al.2000; Hall, 2005) and there are important methodological issues which 
still have to be investigated. Meta-analysis by Garcia-Quevedo (2004) 
found that conclusions may depend on the level of analysis, where there 
is weak evidence that micro-level studies show the existence of crowding 
out effects.  
One of the methodological problems in most studies is that 
estimations may suffer from potential selection problems. Firms given 
grants may have been be chosen by public agencies because they are 
likely to carry out successful research projects. Agencies are, indeed, 
likely to “pick the winners” and support attractive project proposals 
(Wallsten, 2000). If the criteria for allocating public funds are linked to 
high expected rates of return on private R&D funding (David et al 2000; 
Lach, 2002), then the probability of been chosen depends on current 
R&D spending. If this is the case, then public funding becomes 
endogenous, and estimates will be biased and inconsistent if they are not 
addressed in an econometric framework.  
The literature on the econometrics of evaluation offers different 
ways of tackling the existence of an endogenous subsidy variable in 
policy evaluations. These include: (i) regressions with controls, (ii) fixed 
effects or difference-in-difference models, (iii) sample selection models, 
(iv) instrument variable estimators, and (v) non-parametric matching of 
treated and untreated firms.   
This work analyzes a sample of 1233 manufacturing firms in Italy 
and adds a new piece of empirical evidence to the ongoing debate about 
the effectiveness of public support for R&D. Although there is common 
consensus about the importance of R&D in maintaining the 
competitiveness and aggregate growth of firms and countries, Italy has 
been consistently backward in terms of national R&D spending with 
respect to other OECD countries. R&D in Italy represents roughly 1.1% 
of GDP compared to an average of 2% in the UE-15 in the period 2001-
2003. This becomes even more evident if the private R&D spending is 
considered (Capitalia Bank, 2005). 
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A parametric approach is employed to estimate the effect of public 
grants on R&D. In order to take into account  potential self-selection in 
participation in the public funding schemes a two-step selection 
procedure is used in the model (Buson, 2000; Hussinger, 2006).   
Secondly, this paper contributes to the treatment empirical 
literature by applying a non-parametric matching estimation for the 
average treatment effect to measure the impact of subsidies on R&D 
adoption. The basic idea is to determine whether the supported firms 
would have invested the same amount of ICT if they had not received 
assistance by comparing the results for participants in national support 
programmes with those of an appropriate control group of non-
participants. Using a set of covariates the propensity score method 
(PSM) is employed to determine the probability of receiving support and 
to find counter-factuals for each recipient firm. Each subsidised firm is 
matched with a “twin” non-subsidised counterpart, which has the same 
probability of being subsidised. The computed difference is then linked 
to the effects of subsidy on the performance of firms (Busom, 2000; 
Czarnitzki and Fier, 2002; Almus and Czarnitzki, 2003; Aerts and 
Czarnitzki, 2004; Czarnitzki and Hussinger, 2004; Duguet, 2004; 
Czarnitzki et al., 2007; Atzeni and Carboni, 2008).  
The regression results indicate that grants have significant positive 
effects on the level of private R&D spending. The non-parametric 
procedure confirms this result, since firms receiving public support 
would have invested less in research if they had they not been given a 
grant. These firms obtain more additional external financing for research 
than do their similar but non-subsidised counterparts. This suggests that 
public policy may be an effective tool for helping firms to overcome 
their financial constraints. 
The remain of the paper is structured as follows.  characteristics of 
the data and the descriptive statistics. Section III describes the contains 
the regression method used and the results. Section IV describes  the 
matching procedure. Section V outlines the conclusions. 
 
2. Data and variable description 
The data used in this paper comes from the Survey of 
Manufacturing Firms (SMF) carried out by the Area Studi of Capitalia 
Bank (2003). The SMF surveyed a stratified sample of Italian firms with 
11 to 500 employees. It also included all manufacturing firms with more 
than 500 employees. The data was stratified according to the number of 
employees, the sector, and the geographical location. It used the Census 
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of Italian Firms as a benchmark. The SMF contains questionnaire 
information about firms' structure and behaviour, and fifteen years of 
data on their balance sheets (1989-2003). Since only a small fraction of 
the observations overlap, only the 2001-2003 survey is used in the 
empirical application.   
The questionnaire also supplies information on the way total R&D 
is financed, namely venture capital, self-financing, credit, free grants and 
tax reductions. Self-financing is by far the most important and covers 
more than 80% of total R&D expenditure. In this paper firms are 
considered to be subsidised if they received free R&D grants or tax 
reductions for R&D, or both. There are four main types of incentive for 
R&D in Italy. These are as follows: 
a) Law 46/1982 and Law 297/1999: public funds to support 
R&D through free grants or reductions  in interest  rates, or 
tax reductions.  
b) Law 598/1994: grants for innovations,  R&D activities and 
environment oriented investment.  
c) Law 140/97: automatic incentives to invest in R&D through 
tax breaks, particularly for new products and processes. 
 There are three questions in the survey that can be used to 
directly evaluate the firm’s access to the credit market: 1) whether at the 
current market interest rate the firm wants additional credit; 2) whether 
the firm is willing to pay a higher interest rate to obtain that additional 
credit; 3) whether the firm has applied for this credit but been refused. If 
the firm answers “yes” to the second or third questions, it is considered 
to be credit rationed (RATION =1). In this work this variable is used as 
a proxy for firm financial distress.  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for non-granted (controls) 
and  granted firms (treated). There are a total  of 1233 companies which 
invest in research. There are some interesting differences between the 
two groups. Firms which receive grants are larger than non-subsidised 
firms, both in terms of added value and in number of employees. They 
invest more in R&D per worker, employ relatively more research 
workers and  their capital per worker ratio is appreciably lower. They 
also use more external credit and more internal financing, are more 
innovative and use more additional sources of public incentives.  
The relevance of micro analysis is supported by huge differences 
in behaviour, productivity, size and performance across firms and 
industries (e.g. R&D is not normally distributed). Firm level data is better 
for measuring specific aspects that are very difficult to capture at the 
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aggregate level, such as size, industry, age, location, etc. Unfortunately, 
access to longitudinal data is limited. In particular there is not regular 
information on the outcome decision and on the treatment since only a 
small fraction of the observations overlap in the various waves. This 
prevents the analysis to be addressed to important issues such as long-
term effects of public.  
Before proceeding further, I briefly highlight several groups of 
factors that are considered in this work. These may influence a firm’s 
decision on whether or not to engage in privately financed R&D at a 
certain time. The variable of interest is the amount of private R&D 
expenditure (i.e. the firm’s total R&D expenditure minus the total 
governmental R&D grant). R&D expenditure includes the cost of both 
internal and external R&D and is divided by the number of workers. 
This allows us to estimate the net effect of public grants on a firm's own 
research. Unlike many other studies, this work uses the amount of 
subsidy each firm receives to finance their R&D expenditure.   
An important determinant in firm level R&D is firm size 
(measured by the number of employees). Size can affect R&D decisions 
in several ways, such as better organization, easier use of the financial 
markets, specialization of activities and routines, and investment in 
complementary activities to R&D. Moreover, since size can help to 
overcome the fixed cost barrier, it becomes an important factor in 
determining whether or not the firm invests in R&D.  
Capital intensity is important, since more capital-intensive firms 
may have higher commitments to innovation than more labour-intensive 
ones. The number of researchers as a percentage of the total number of 
employees is used  in the analysis as an indicator of internal technological 
capabilities, the state of technology and the structured (stable) firms’ 
R&D commitment. A measure of indebtedness is also considered in 
order to control for firm financial potentiality to find sources to support 
R&D cost.  Internal and credit (external) financing for research are 
considered, since they directly affect the total amount of resources 
devoted to R&D. 
A measure of the financial constraints is also considered. Such 
constraints are in general good at explaining under-investment in 
technology and in R&D expenditure. The measure of financial 
constraints also provides an approximate proxy of credit market 
efficiency. The final cost of doing research may vary across firms due to 
differences in the availability and cost of financial resources. Arguments 
that R&D investment are generally more risky, sunk costs and other 
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forms of market failures are commonly seen as having particularly severe 
effects in this field. 
An export dummy is included since firms that compete in foreign 
markets might tend to be more innovative than others (Arnold and 
Hussinger, 2005) and hence more likely to apply for subsidies. Industry 
dummies are used to pick-up sector heterogeneity. There might be 
presence of significant cross-sectional differences in technological 
opportunity, appropriability conditions which may have also effects on 
innovation behaviour of individual establishments and competences. 
Moreover in some industries fixed costs will be lower than in others. 
Controls for fixed effects may be desirable in such cases, so that some of 
these unobservable effects can be captured.  
 
3. The econometric framework and results 
Two possible methods may be used to estimate the effects of 
public finance programmes on the level of private R&D. One is a 
structural model which can explain the factors which determine the 
decision to invest in R&D as well as the parameters which affect 
participation in the program. A second possibility is to obtain an 
estimate of the policy effect applying a quasi-experimental approach and 
comparing outcomes for a treated group of firms and a control group. I 
start specifying the structural model. 
Empirical studies of the effects of R&D grants on firms typically 
regress some measure of firm productivity on the subsidy, along with 
other control characteristics. A positive coefficient for public R&D can 
be interpreted as meaning that there is complementarity between public 
and private R&D investment, while a negative coefficient is taken to 
imply that public R&D substitutes private R&D. The estimation typically 
takes this form: 
εγδβα ++++= ZXGRANTy )(    (1) 
Where y is some measure of R&D, GRANT is the amount of 
public subsidy to firm i, X is a set of firm characteristics while Z 
represents dummies explaining other observables such as industry or 
location. ε is the error term. However, the main methodological caveat in 
this type of estimation is that firms self select into the grants project 
giving rise to inconsistent coefficients unless selection bias is considered. 
One common way of tackling this problem is to apply a two-step 
selection estimate, with a selection equation describing the participation 
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decision and an outcome equation describing the relationship between 
the outcome in which one is interested and a vector of covariates 
(Heckman, 1979). The rationale for this is that the decision to participate 
may depend on factors other than those in the regression model. If the 
random components are not distributed independently because some of 
the unobserved characteristics affecting y may also affect the selection 
process, observations in the sample will then be systematically different 
from those not in the sample. In such cases a more general two-stage 
model may be required. 
The following variables are used in this study to estimate equation 
(1). The dependent variable is the amount of private internal R&D 
expenditure over the period 2001-2003 with the amount of the subsidy 
subtracted (LogR&DEMP). It is divided by labour units and log-
transformed in order to avoid dimensional effects.2 I believe that it is 
important to make this distinction in order to be able to distinguish 
clearly between the total amount of R&D (which implicitly includes the 
subsidies) and the firm’s private commitment to research. 
LogGRANTEMP is the amount of subsidy granted to firm i over the 
same period. LogEMP2001 is the number of workers at the beginning of 
the period and this is used to measure firm size. Its squared term 
(Log2EMP(2001)) is included in order to check for possible size effects. 
LogKEMPL(2001) is capital intensity. The variable LogEMPR&D-EMPL(2001) is the 
number of R&D workers as a percentage of total workers. These 
variables are divided by labour units so as to reduce collinearity with firm 
size and log-transformed in order to avoid dimensional effects. 
DEBTBANK-PASS (2001) is the ratio of debt to banks over total average debts 
as an indicator of the firm's financial structure. 
INNOV, RATION, EXPORT and GRANTOTHER  are dummies 
for innovation, credit constraints export and other grants, respectively. I 
also include among the regressors a dummy to check for grant awarded 
firms with zero private investment in research (R&DEMP (2001-2003)=0) and 
15 industry dummies (ISTAT-ATECO classification) to control for 
potential fixed effects. The model is estimated as a cross-section.  
The first specification of equation (1) is reported in Table 2 
(column 1). Here the whole sample is considered and the treatment has a 
dichotomy status taking the value of one when firms receive the subsidy 
and zero otherwise. Although very crude, this supplies the first 
                                                 
2
 In order to avoid the dropping of observations when private financing was 
zero, for these firms  the expenditure levels are arbitrarily set as 0.1€. 
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significant information. If the whole sample is considered, then the grant 
assisted firms have on average higher levels of private R&D spending 
(0.19 with 5% probability).   
 Column (2) shows the OLS results on the restricted sample of 
grant awarded firms only. The effect of subsidies on the recipient firms 
is positive and highly significant: this suggests that grants encourage 
private investment in R&D. However in the OLS regression the funding 
status is considered as exogenous and does not take into account 
potential selectivity. The next step is to tackle this problem by applying a 
two stage selection procedure.  
Column (3) gives details of the results. The null hypothesis that 
the regression equation and the selection equation are independent 
cannot be rejected with 5% significance. The coefficient estimate on the 
grant variable is again statistically significant, suggesting that public 
support is a good predictor of private R&D spending. This confirms that 
subsidies produce higher R&D spending at firm level and that full 
crowding-out effects are not present in the sample. 
However, another methodological caveat when this type of 
estimate is used is that the amount of the subsidy may be correlated with 
the error term (ε). Since participation and R&D expenditures may be 
simultaneously determined, estimates of the policy effects will be 
inconsistent unless selection bias and simultaneity are properly 
considered. To test for endogeneity I regressed the variable GRANT on 
the same set of covariates and including the total amount of industry 
grant per worker as a substitute for industry dummies (Z): 
11111 )( εφδα +++= GRANTjINDXGRANT   (2) 




),( jiGRANTj GRANTIND     (3) 
Following Lichtenberg (1988) and Wallsten (2000), such a variable 
is constructed on an industry base in order to capture the potential grant 
available to the firm, depending on the type of research that it carries 
out. I then regressed the R&D equation on the same set of covariates 
but one, and on the residuals formed the GRANT equation (Davidson 
and MacKinnon, 1993): 
εεθγδβα +++++= 11ZXGRANTy   (4)  
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Since the coefficient of residuals is highly insignificant, the 
hypothesis that GRANT is correlated with unobserved factors can be 
rejected and the OLS is consistent (Table 3).  
 
4. The matching procedure  
The second objective of this work is to estimate the effect of 
participating in an R&D programme compared to non-participation. To 
evaluate the effects of government subsidies, one has to analyse what 
would have happened without the incentive program. Since neither the 
subsidized firms nor the non-subsidized firms can be considered random 
distributions, the challenge is to identify a reliable control group. 
Matching is a method which is often used (Heckman et al, 1998; 
Heckman and Navarro-Lozano, 2004). In the absence of experimental 
data, matching estimators have the convenient feature of approximating 
to a randomised ex post experiment.  
Smith and Todd (2005) provide a detailed evaluation of the 
performance of different matching estimators such as nearest neighbour 
matching, kernel and local linear matching, and difference-in-differences 
matching. They also show that if the data is of high quality, matching is a 
good choice. The aim of this approach is to compare the outcome (R&D 
in this study) for participants in national support programmes with those 
of an appropriate control group of non-participants.  
The most common evaluation parameter is the mean effect of 
treatment on the treated. This gives information about how much a 
treated firm (i.e. receiving the incentive: D = 1) benefits compared to 
how much it would have done if not treated (i.e. not receiving the 
subsidy: D = 0) given a set of characteristics X. The parameter is given 
by: 
)1,|( 01 =− DXYYE                    (5)                                                                                
Moreover, Y1 and Y0 are observed only for participant and non-
participant firms respectively. Evaluation then depends on the problem 
of missing data. The benefit of receiving the subsidy can be measured as 
the difference  = Y1-Y0  if the two outcomes for the same firm are 
available. Observed data does not contain sample counterparts for the 
missing counterfactual Y0 for subsidised firms. This need to be inferred 
in some way from the sample. Using non-experimental data the 
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parameter is estimated by assuming that conditioning on X, (Y1, Y0) and 
D are independent: 
XDYY |),( 01 ⊥         (6)                                                                                         
where ⊥  denotes independence. This assumption is required so that, X, 
the non-subsidised firms’ outcomes, have the same distribution as firms 
would have achieved if they had not participated in the public funding 
programme. This restriction, also known as “selection on observables” 
requires that the choice of participation is “purely random” for similar 
individuals. In terms of mean value, the implication of (6) is: 
)0,|()1,|( 10 === DXYEDXYE      (7) 
given that the Y0 results are independent of collaboration participation, 
conditional on X, they are also independent of participation, conditional 
on the propensity score Pr(U=1|X) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). 
Hence, employing a probit model to estimate the conditional probability 
of participating in the program, the multi-dimensionality of the matching 
problem is reduced by matching on a mono-dimensional (scalar) 
propensity score: 
Pr{Di=1 | Xi} = F(h(Xi))     (8) 
where F(.) is the normal or logistic cumulative distribution, and h(Xi) is a 
function of covariates. Once the probability of participation has been 
estimated, PSM matches each participant with a single “twin” non-
participant. A metric criterion can also be imposed to ensure that the 
match is sufficiently close: 
{ } { }01|,|min)( =∈=∈−= DjDiXXXC jiji    (9) 
Two twins firms are matched by overlapping the propensity scores 
for treated and non-treated firms. The average difference in the outcome 
between subsidised firms and their non-subsidised twin counterpart will 
provide an estimator of the impact of the government's grant policy. 3   
This can be expressed formally as: 
                                                 
3
 The common case considered in the literature is just one binary treatment. 
However, Imbens (2000), Lechner (2001), Gerfin and Lechner (2002) Czarnitzki 


























ψ  (10) 
Finally an identification assumption is also required, because if all 
individuals with given characteristics choose to participate in the 
programme, there would be no observation on similar individuals that 
choose not to participate (Abadie and Imbens, 2002). Formally: 
0somefor1)|1(Pr >−<==< ccxXDc   (11)                                                                             
In the terms first used by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), when 
both condition are satisfied the treatment is said to be ‘strongly 
ignorable’, so that the non-randomised experiment can be treated as if it 
were a randomised one. However, as pointed out by Abadie and Imbens 
(2002), these conditions are in many cases not satisfied, giving rise to 
some bias in the estimation.  
In approximating a randomized ex post experiment we want to 
compare firms with grants with similar firms without grants. The 
problem is that there are mixed firms in this second group. Some did not 
ask for grants and others asked for, but did not receive, grants. If the 
latter are included in the matching, the selection cannot be considered 
akin to an ex post random one and the control group is biased, as it 
includes lower quality firms which have been refused the subsidy. Since 
the two groups cannot be considered random draws, the problem is to 
identify a reliable control group. 
Evidence from table (1) in support of the random allocation 
hypothesis is not unequivocal. Treated firms invest more in research, are 
larger, have a lower capital per worker ratio and a slightly higher 
proportion of R&D employees. Such a group has a higher level of self-
financing and uses about double the amount of credit for research per 
worker. They also have a higher propensity to innovate and use other 
forms of grants more. Interesting, firms engaged in R&D are not a self-
selected group where financing constraints tend to be either less or more 
binding. Moreover, treatment and control groups may also differ in their 
unobservable characteristics and so the robustness of results would be 
undermined. However, there might be non-granted firms close to their 
control counterparts. In that case, despite group differences, it is possible 





The matching results 
With this framework in mind, in order to account for potential 
selectivity bias, I first estimate the probability of  a firm of receiving 
public funds, given a number of observable characteristics that 
potentially influence the probability of receiving public R&D support 
(Busom, 2000, Gonzalez et al., 2005 and Czarnitzki and Licht, 2006). 
Table 4 shows the probit estimation results (probability of participating 
in national-level programmes) based on data from a sample of 1224 
firms that invest in R&D. The covariates are taken from regression (1). 
The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating participation in 
public R&D programs.  
The following determinants are found to have significant influence 
on whether or not the firms receive public R&D funds. The probability 
of receiving public funds decreases with the amount of spending on 
R&D. The probability of receiving public funds increases with the size of 
the firms, though at a declining rate (the squared term of size is negative 
and significant at 5 percent). The percentage of R&D workers compared 
to total workforce is positive and highly significant. This suggests that 
firms’ structured R&D strongly effects the probability of being 
subsidised. Surprisingly, there is no evidence that the ratio of external 
indebtedness influences the probability of receiving the award. The same 
is true for innovation and export dummies. Furthermore firms seeking 
additional external finance from the banking system do not receive 
subsidies more often than other firms.  
The probit model is then applied to estimate a mono-dimensional 
propensity score for each observation. This measure is used to find 
counter-factuals for each subsidised firm and allows the sample to be 
divided up into those which participate in the public R&D schemes and 
a potential control group of non-subsidised firms. Using the propensity 
score value, each recipient firm is matched with a similar non-granted 
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counterpart that has the same probability of being subsidised.4 The 
matching of the two groups is considered as successful if there is no 
significant difference in the means of the probability of receiving R&D 
support and the means of determinants of receipt of subsidy. Given the 
matching assumptions (6 and 11), the only observable difference 
between the treated and the control group is grant receipt, and hence 
one can evaluate the effect of grants on R&D by estimating the 
difference in expenditure between the treated group and the matched 
control group, given the above assumptions. 
The estimated propensity scores are divided into six blocks (Table 
5). In each block there are a number of participants and the number of 
comparable non-participants. The region of common support is in the 
range (.02537076, .86902463.). This means that there are no participants 
with a predicted probability smaller than 0.02537, and no non-
participants with a probability higher than 0.8690. For each participant it 
is selected a set of non-participants (control group) that have a similar 
probability to participate according to the observed characteristics. 
Moreover, to improve the quality of the matching, the region of 
common support is further restricted to less than 0.840 since no twins 
observations lie outside this threshold. 2 treated firms and 633 non 
treated firms are leftover for lack of match. 
Figures 1 and 2 also show the estimated propensity scores for the 
treated and untreated firms and supply some preliminary insights about 
the two groups. From figure (1) it emerges that there is a considerable 
divergence between the two samples in the data set, confirming the 
initial worries about possible bias in the two groups. However once the 
sample has been “cleaned” of non-twin firms and only potentially 
matching firms are selected (Fig. 2), the nearest neighbours distributions 
for subsidised firms and the control group are sufficiently similar. 
                                                 
4
 However, there might be unobservable factors that induce non granted firms 
to invest their own funds in research and which make the selection of twin firms 
rather difficult. In such cases the comparison would be rather unreliable. 
Among unobservable factors the capability to implement an R&D project, for 
instance, strongly depends on the level of informal skills of the firm’s employees 





The results of the matching procedure are then reported in Table 
(6). To corroborate the validity of the comparison, in the same table the 
matching diagnostic shows the mean value, differences and standard 
deviation of the firms matched in each group and sub-group. Since the 
outcome variable is expressed in euro per worker it is easy to interpret. 
The average effect of being given a subsidy is € 783.49 per worker, 
confirming that grants have a positive effect on private investment in 
R&D, as was found in the regression analysis. Given that the 
assumptions of this methodology, this would imply that subsidised firms 
would have invested considerably less if they had not been given the 
subsidy.5 Such amounts becomes even more significant when one 
considers that the average amount of private R&D investment is € 2891. 
In the sample the public support program improves research of about 27 
percent over the period considered.  
A plausible justification of this results is that financially supported 
firms are more dependent on public aid in their R&D investment 
decision. In terms of policy it implies that public program is efficient 
since it supports marginal R&D projects which are expected to be 
privately low profitable and would be not pursued without a subsidy. 
As a further step, to further focus on this argument and to shed 
some light on the complementarity or crowding-out issue, it might be 
useful to investigate whether grants effect the alternative sources of 
R&D financing that firms have access to, namely internal financing and 
external credit. This would allow to understand a little more about the 
relationships between public support, financing and the attitude towards 
R&D in the firms.   
Table (7) shows the average effect of grants on the internal 
resources that the firms use to finance R&D. The results for firms with 
grants show that the support has a positive effect on the research 
program (more than € 400 per worker). However the result is not 
sufficiently significant hence, it does not allow a definite conclusion 
about potential additive effect from subsidies to this source of financing. 
                                                 
5
 This result is in line with Busom (2000), Georghiou and Roessner (2000), 
Almus and Czarnitzki (2003), Czarnitzki and Hussinger (2004), Duguet (2004), 
Czarnitzki et al. (2007), Aerts and Czarnitzki (2005), Görg and Strobl (2007). All 
those matching studies reject a complete crowding out of private R&D efforts 
through public subsidies concluding that, on average, public funding stimulate 




The non significant coefficient simply suggests that differences between 
granted and non granted firms are not unequivocal. 
The matching procedure is then applied to the amount of external 
credit, given the grant per employee as the treatment variable. The 
results reported in Table (8) are as expected. Given that public financing 
boosts private R&D expenditure and that the additional R&D is not 
financed through the firm's own resources, recipient firms make use of 
an additional € 347 external credit to finance their R&D expenditure 
compared to their non-granted counterparts. Again, given assumptions 
(6, 11), this implies that treated firms would have used (obtained) less 
credit if they had not entered the R&D program. This confirms the 
results in the general R&D matching. Subsidized firms invest more in 
private R&D than do non-subsidized ones. Furthermore it is particularly 
external credit financing that benefits from public support and this is 
complementary to private R&D investment.  
Though the analysis in this paper does not allow us to identify 
causalities one straightforward conclusion is that firms awarded grants 
would have received less external credit for their research projects if they 
had not been in the public program. Since the results on the effects of 
the treatment status on internal funds are inconclusive, the total amount 
of private R&D would have been significantly lower. Hence, particularly 
when one considers the inefficiencies inherent in innovation, grants may 
be an important way of helping firms to overcome their financial 
constraints (Hall, 2002; Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005; Czarnitzki, 2006; 
Binz and Czarnitzki, 2008).  
There are various theoretical arguments on the effects of financial 
constraints on R&D (see Hall, 2002 for a review of the literature). These 
include incomplete appropriability of knowledge, information 
asymmetries due to the very nature of innovation processes, uncertainty 
on the returns of research (Arrow, 1962). These give rise to moral hazard 
and adverse selection problems. Information asymmetries result in 
financial constraints and credit rationing (Fazzari-Hubbard-Petersen 
1988, Hoshi-Kashyap-Sharfstein 1992, Bond-Meghir, 1994). Credit 
markets are not likely to work efficiently and underinvestment in R&D is 
likely. 
From the point of view of investment theory, R&D has a number 
of characteristics that make it different from ordinary investment (Binz 
and Czarnitzki, 2008). R&D activities can be considered as an 
investment in a firm’s knowledge capital. In practice, a certain amount of 
R&D spending goes to paying the wages and salaries of highly educated 
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researchers. Their efforts create an intangible asset which, particularly in 
the R&D field, tends to be both riskier and harder to give collateral value 
to. Unlike traditional investment, there is no capitalized value in firms’ 
balance sheets which can be used as collateral in credit negotiations. The 
arguments about capital market imperfections and financing research 
programs are based on the investors’ difficulty in distinguishing good 
projects from bad ones. Thus potential lenders like banks tend to be 
reluctant to finance R&D. As a result this has to be mostly financed 
from internal resources (the “financing gap” hypothesis).  
Furthermore, as the rate of return required by an external investor 
may be consistently higher than that required by the company investing 
its own resources, external sources to finance R&D are likely to be 
difficult to obtain or costly, even when there are tax incentives or 
subsidies (Hall, 2002). Thus financial constraints on R&D are more likely 
to occur and these restrict the development of hi-tech firms, which may 
have to abandon crucial innovative projects. In such cases public policy 
may help firms to overcome in part their financial constraints and to 
mitigate potential underinvestment in R&D. 
From a policy perspective all these arguments justify the social 
desirability of public schemes designed to reduce the costs for firms of 
investing in R&D. The rationale of such a policy is based on the fact that 
the cost of R&D capital is relatively high when compared to other types 
of investment and the subsidy program tries to mitigate this.6 Hyytinen 
and Toivanen (2005) provide evidence that government funding helps 
firms from industries that are dependent on external finance. Czarnitzki 
and Toole (2007) find that R&D subsidies mitigate the effect of product 
market uncertainty on R&D investment and suggest ways in which 
public policies can increase R&D investment. Together with Czarnitzki 
(2006), these studies combine discussions about financial constraints and 
R&D subsidies and conclude that subsidies reduce the problem of 





                                                 
6
 There is, however, an alternative approach, which relies on the private sector, 
that attempts to close the financing gap by reducing the degree of asymmetric 
information and moral hazard rather than simply subsidizing the investment 
(Hall, 2002).  
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5. Concluding remarks 
This paper provides empirical evidence on the effects of public 
R&D funding on firms’ R&D investment per employee in the Italian 
manufacturing sector. Given the critical importance of investment in 
research and development as a factor which drives innovation and 
economic growth, it is important to explore how public policies such as 
R&D subsidies influence private R&D investment. Public R&D 
programs are generally aimed at supporting R&D projects with large 
expected social benefits but with low expected private returns. An 
efficient technology program would not fund inframarginal projects. 
These are expected to be privately profitable and would be carried out 
without a subsidy. This is a typical policy exercise. 
When evaluating public funding for R&D, it is of interest to 
investigate the firms’ response to subsidies. The issue is then whether 
public financial support complements or substitutes R&D spending. If 
the latter is the case, then firms simply replace private sources with 
public ones, leaving the final level of research spending unchanged. 
Grants are clearly inefficient since it is very likely that the R&D project 
would have been carried out even without public support. Given that 
public resources are raised via socially costly revenue mechanisms, the 
end result will be that the whole economy is worse off.  
The results of this work are consistent with the hypothesis that 
public funds have a positive effect on private R&D expenditure. Firms 
given grants achieve levels of private R&D investment that are greater 
than they would have been without public support. In terms of policy, it 
also suggests that public programs are efficient since they support 
marginal R&D projects which are expected to be low in profit and which 
would be not pursued without a subsidy.  
When exploring the effect of public grants on the financial sources 
of R&D, the analysis provides primary evidence that public policy 
complements the capital markets. According to the results of this work, 
firms given grants would have received less external credits for their 
research projects if they had not been in the public program. One 
possible interpretation of this may be that since the financial constraints 
are quite similar for firms with or without grants, there is the same 
“desire” for additional external credit in the two sub-samples. However, 
grant-assisted firms make use of consistently more credit than do those 
without grants, and this additional credit is invested in R&D. This 
explains why such firms carry out more private (non-subsidised) R&D 
than their non-subsidised counterparts. 
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These findings are consistent with the view that that government 
funding can alleviate financial constraints and have positive effects on 
the borrowing capacity of firms. It is well-known that R&D investment 
usually involves higher risks than investment in tangible physical assets, 
and that asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders has 
particularly severe effects in this case. There are likely to be negative 
effects on firms' abilities to pursue R&D projects and this also damages 










Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Mean (€) Std. Dev. 
R&D per employee (triennium 
average) 2384.87 3479.00 2875.18 3649.62 
Subsidised R&D investment per 
worker (triennium average) 0.00 0.00 1258.65 1943.73 
Value added (triennium average) 8386.92 23091.99 10279.65 40884.35 
Employees (2001) 148.41 373.53 167.34 673.42 
Fixed capital per worker (2001) 50.24 59.21 46.05 49.73 
R&D employees over total 
employees (2001) 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.09 
Bank credit over total debt (2001) 0.20 0.18 0.22 0.18 
Internal financing to R&D per 
employee (triennium average) 2071.48 3248.78 2313.76 3240.45 
External credit to R&D per 
employee (triennium average) 248.57 1232.19 516.16 1648.07 
INNOVATION=1 if firm has 
innovated 0.84 0.36 0.90 0.31 
RATION =1 if firm is credit 
rationed 0.06 0.24 0.07 0.26 
EXPORT=1 if firm has exported 0.89 0.31 0.89 0.31 
OTHER SUBSIDIES=1 if firm 
has received other types of public 

















log private R&D per 
employee (triennium 
average) 
OLS:   
obs. 1233 






 Coef. Coef. Coef. 
LogGRANTEMP (2001-
2003) 0.19**  0.33*** 0.33*** 
LogEMP(2001) 0.06 -0.31 -0.35 
Log2EMP(2001) 0.01 0.04 0.03 
LogKEMPL(2001) 0.12*** 0.06 0.05 
LogEMPR&D-EMP(2001) 0.52 0.26*** 0.03 
DEBTBANK-PASS (2001) -0.15 -0.29 -0.55 
RATION 0.03 0.24 0.15 
INNOV 0.08 -0.03 -0.13 
EXPORT 0.14 0.08 0.07 
GRANTOTHER -0.03 0.01 -0.27* 
R&DEMP (2001-2003)=0 -7.16*** -7.72*** -7.72*** 
Constant 7.07*** 5.60*** 7.34*** 
15 industry dummies  
(results not reported) - - - 
*** significant at 1%,  
**   significant at 5%, 
*     significant at 10%  
 
R2=0.61 
Adj R2= 0.60 
 
R2=0.89 
Adj R2 = 0.88 
 
LR test of indep. 
eqns. (rho=0):   








Table 3. Durbin–Wu–Hausman (augmented regression 






R&D  .71 0.31 
Hy: coeff. residuals = 0   
F (1,  330) = 0.10 
Prob > F =  0.7538 
  
R&D equation is regressed on all exogenous variable but one, one 
including the total amount of industry grant per worker as a regressor 
as a substitutes of industry dummies. Since the coefficient of residuals 





Table 4. Probit parameter estimates of determinants of 
receipt of public R&D grants 
Dependent: 
Grants to R&D  
investment 
obs: 1226   
 Coef. Z 
LogR&D(2001) -0.07*** -6.27 
LogEMP(2001) 0.71** 2.99 
Log2EMP(2001) -0.05*** -2.07 
LogEMPR&D-EMP(2001) 0.45*** 9.01 
LogKEMPL(2001) 0.02 0.35 
DEBTBANK-PASS (2001) 0.39 1.65 
RATION 0.12 0.72 
INNOV 0.16 1.3 
EXPORT -0.16 -1.17 
GRANTOTHER 0.46*** 4.39 
Constant -1.07* -1.85 
15 Industry dummies 
(results not reported) 
- - 
*** significant at 1%,  
**   significant at 5%, 
































Tab. 5. Number of blocks of treated and controls for 
participation in national programmes 











.009 374 57 431 
.2 226 67 293 
.3 140 80 220 
.4 113 109 222 
.6 16 37 53 
0.8 1 45 46 
Total 870 354 1224 
Note: the common support option has been selected. The 
region of common support is [.02537076, .86902463]. The final 
number of blocks is 6.  This number of blocks ensures that the 
mean propensity score is not different for treated and controls 
in each block. 
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TREATED (obs: 354);   CONTROLS matching (obs: 870)























TREATED (obs: 352);   CONTROLS matching (obs: 237)






















Tab. 6 Average Treatment Effect (ATT) of Grants on private 
R&D 
Outcome variable:  private R&D spending (€  per worker). 
Treatment variable: GRANT (0,1). 
Estimation of the ATT with the Nearest Neighbour Matching method 
(random draw version) 
Obs. ATT (€) Std. Error t 
Treated: 352 
Control: 237  
783.49 287.56 2.72 
 
Matching diagnostic 
   
 Mean (€) Std. Dev.  
Average outcome of the 
matched treated 
2891.51 3653.52  
Average outcome of the 
matched controls 
2108.02 2566.52  
Average absolute p-score 
difference between treated  
and controls 







Tab. 7. Average Treatment Effect (ATT) of Grants on Internal 
Financed R&D 
Outcome variable:  R&D spending financed by internal funds (€  per 
worker).  
Treatment variable: GRANT (0,1) 
Estimation of the ATT with the Nearest Neighbour Matching method 
(random draw version) 
Obs. ATT (€) Std. Error t 
Treated: 352 
Control: 237  
417.46 270.57 1.543 
 
Matching diagnostic 
   
 Mean (€) Std. Dev.  
Average outcome of the 
matched treated 
2326.90 3244.95  
Average outcome of the 
matched controls 
1909.44 2533.59  
Average absolute p-score 
difference between treated  
and controls 





Tab. 8 Average Treatment Effect (ATT) of Grants on Credit 
Financed R&D 
Outcome variable:   R&D spending financed by credit (€  per worker). 
Treatment variable: GRANT (0,1). 
Estimation of the ATT with the Nearest Neighbour Matching method 
(random draw version). 
Obs. ATT (€) Std. Error t 
Treated: 352 
Control: 237  
347.670 106.822 3.255 
 
Matching diagnostic 
   
 Mean (€) Std. Dev.  
Average outcome of the 
matched treated 
519.09 1652.29  
Average outcome of the 
matched controls 
171.4211 709.23  
Average absolute p-score 
difference between treated  
and controls 
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